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A critical aspect of inferential reasoning is the ability to form relationships between items
or events that were not experienced together. This review considers different perspectives
on the role of the hippocampus in successful inferential reasoning during both memory
encoding and retrieval. Intuitively, inference can be thought of as a logical process by
which elements of individual existing memories are retrieved and recombined to answer
novel questions. Such flexible retrieval is sub-served by the hippocampus and is thought to
require specialized hippocampal encoding mechanisms that discretely code events such
that event elements are individually accessible from memory. In addition to retrieval-based
inference, recent research has also focused on hippocampal processes that support the
combination of information acquired across multiple experiences during encoding. This
mechanism suggests that by recalling past events during new experiences, connections
can be created between newly formed and existing memories. Such hippocampally
mediated memory integration would thus underlie the formation of networks of related
memories that extend beyond direct experience to anticipate future judgments about the
relationships between items and events. We also discuss integrative encoding in the
context of emerging evidence linking the hippocampus to the formation of schemas as
well as prospective theories of hippocampal function that suggest memories are actively
constructed to anticipate future decisions and actions.
Keywords: hippocampus, inference, memory, encoding, retrieval, integration, flexibility
INTRODUCTION
Many judgments and decisions in our everyday lives are not based
on direct experience, but rather require inference based on knowl-
edge acquired across multiple distinct experiences. For example,
imagine you encounter an unfamiliar man leaving the house next
door to walk his Great Dane. Because the house was recently sold,
you might conclude that the man and his dog are your new neigh-
bors. Several days later, you are in the park and see the same Great
Dane again out for a walk, this time with a woman. From the
knowledge acquired on these two separate occasions, you may
infer a relationship between the man and woman; for instance,
you may deduce that they are a couple and recently moved into
the house next door with their Great Dane. Successful inferential
reasoning may thus depend on our ability to recall detailed infor-
mation from past events to determine how items experienced
at different times are related. A growing body of literature indi-
cates that such flexibility to combine experiences in novel ways to
infer unobserved relationships between items or events crucially
depends on the hippocampus.
The ability to infer a relationship between two previously expe-
rienced events is complex, involving several distinct operations.
While some of these operations rely predominantly on brain
structures outside the medial temporal lobe such as prefrontal
cortex, others necessitate hippocampal processing. For successful
inference to ultimately take place, the arbitrary relations among
previously unrelated elements within an event must be encoded
(e.g., individual Great Dane–man and Great Dane–woman asso-
ciations from the example above). To extract new information
about the relationship between these events, encoded associa-
tions must be retrieved and then manipulated, recombined, and
recoded based on their content to support the inference itself
(man–woman). The precise contribution of hippocampus to each
of these processes remains an area of active investigation and
is a focus of this review. Notably, while these operations are all
requisite for inference, the relative role of the hippocampus in
these different processes—and the relative timing of each—may
depend on the particular demands of the task at hand.
An important factor contributing to success in a variety of
inference tasks is the nature of the underlying hippocampal
memory representations. Decades of research have characterized
how the hippocampus builds rich, detailed records of individ-
ual events, or episodic memories (Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001;
Squire et al., 2004; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Preston and Wagner,
2007). Hippocampal memory representations are well-suited for
the particular demands of inferential reasoning tasks, as the
hippocampus is thought to discretely code multiple event ele-
ments in terms of their relationships to one another (Cohen
and Eichenbaum, 1993; O’Reilly and Rudy, 2001). Such discrete
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elemental coding allows hippocampal representations to be flexi-
ble, as relevant details of past events can be individually accessed
as needed to support the types of novel decisions required in
inferential reasoning.
Here, we discuss the developing literature linking hippocam-
pal memory processes and representations to successful inference
in a variety of tasks. By reviewing findings from both human
and animal research, we highlight the hippocampal mechanisms
that underlie mnemonic flexibility during both encoding and
retrieval. We also argue that inferential reasoning provides a
means of exploring the adaptive nature of memory, whereby
memory representations are used to successfully negotiate current
behavior and anticipate future decisions and actions.
INFERENTIAL REASONING TASKS
The novel expression of learned information has many forms,
ranging from generalization of conditioned responses to novel
stimuli in animals (Pavlov, 1927) to transfer of a learned task
structure to new perceptual settings in humans (Kumaran et al.,
2009). In this review, we focus specifically on the hippocam-
pal mechanisms supporting the novel application of mem-
ory during inferential reasoning tasks that require judgments
about the relationships between items experienced across discrete
episodes.
Several paradigms have been used to study the role of the
hippocampus in inferential reasoning (Figure 1), of which the
most widely used in both animal (e.g., Dusek and Eichenbaum,
1997) and human research (e.g., Heckers et al., 2004) is the tran-
sitive inference task (Figure 1A). In this task, participants learn
a set of overlapping premise relationships (e.g., A > B, B > C,
C > D, D > E, E > F) via trial and error. During this initial
training phase, participants learn to select the correct (i.e., rein-
forced) item. Training typically continues until a criterion level of
performance on premise associations is reached.
Notably, multiple types of representations may support learn-
ing in this task. For instance, knowledge of reinforcement histo-
ries alone may guide memory for the end items of the hierarchy
(A is always rewarded, F is never rewarded) and individual condi-
tional associations may support memory for the inner pairs in the
hierarchy (e.g., C is rewarded in the context of D, but not in the
context of B). Alternatively, all items may be represented simul-
taneously as an ordered hierarchy of relationships (A > B > C >
D > E > F) that concisely represents trained associations as well
as information about the relationships between items that were
not directly trained (e.g., B> D).
To assess which types of representations support performance
as well as how they may depend on the hippocampus, knowl-
edge of the premise associations is tested together with novel,
untrained combinations of items during the critical test phase.
Novel test trials include inferential pairs with one degree of sep-
aration between items (e.g., B ? D, C ? E) as well as pairs with
two degrees of separation (e.g., B ? E), depending on the total
number of items in the hierarchy. Novel non-inferential pair-
ings consisting of the end items of the hierarchy (e.g., A ? F)
are also tested. Critically, correct performance on the inferential
test trials can only be achieved by considering the overarching
hierarchy of relationships because both items (e.g., B and D)
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FIGURE 1 | Inference tasks. (A) Transitive inference task with six
elements. A set of overlapping training pairs forms an ordered hierarchy of
relationships. Participants learn each individual training pair via
feedback-based learning (e.g., A > B) and are then tested on novel
inference and novel non-inference judgments. Items in inferential probe
trials may be separated by one element in the hierarchy (e.g., B ? D,
indicated as 1◦) or two elements (e.g., B ? E, indicated as 2◦). Novel
non-inferential probes test knowledge of the relationship between the end
items of the hierarchy (A ? F). (B) Acquired equivalence task. In stage one
of training, participants are trained via feedback to associate two faces
(F1 and F2) with a particular scene (S1). In stage two, participants learn to
select a second scene (S2) when cued with one of the faces (F1). Inference
is then measured as the proportion of trials on which participants choose
S2 when cued with F2. The schematic depicts trained stimulus–response
relationships (solid black arrows) and inferential relationships (dashed black
arrows). (C) Associative inference task. Participants learn an overlapping set
of associations (here, face–house associations), in which two stimuli (a man
and a woman) are associated with a common third item (a house). Novel
inference trials evaluate knowledge for the indirect relationship between
items (who lives together in the same house).
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are reinforced at the same rate during training.1 In contrast,
success on non-inferential test trials involving the end items
can be based solely on the reinforcement histories (A is always
reinforced, F is never reinforced) and does not require refer-
ence to the hierarchical relationships. This difference in task
demands may be reflected by differing degrees of hippocam-
pal recruitment for inferential and non-inferential test probes.
Specifically, hippocampal engagement may be unique to inferen-
tial judgments that require reference to an ordered hierarchy of
stimuli.
A second task used to examine the role of the hippocampus
in inference is the acquired equivalence task (Figure 1B; Myers
et al., 2003; Shohamy andWagner, 2008). In this task, participants
learn a set of stimulus–response associations via feedback train-
ing, such as learning to select Scene1 when cued with Face1. In
the first stage, the stimulus–response relationships are organized
such that two distinct cue stimuli are associated with the same
response (e.g., Face1–Scene1, Face2–Scene1). In the second train-
ing stage, additional information is learned about one of those cue
items (e.g., Face1–Scene2) that can also be inferred to be true for
the second, equivalent item (e.g., Face2). Thus, unlike the transi-
tive inference task, the overlapping associations in the acquired
equivalence task do not form a logical hierarchy. Inference in
the acquired equivalence task is assessed by testing participants’
knowledge of novel, untrained associations (Face2–Scene2) that
can be inferred through transfer of learned associations (Face1–
Scene2) to the equivalent item. While premise pairs may be
encoded as inflexible stimulus–response associations, only rep-
resentations that encode discrete event elements together with
the relationships among them—such as those formed by the
hippocampus—are thought to support the acquired equivalence
judgment.
Another commonly used inferential reasoning paradigm is
the associative inference task (Figure 1C; e.g., Bunsey and
Eichenbaum, 1996; Preston et al., 2004). In associative inference,
stimuli are organized into groups of three and presented to partic-
ipants as overlapping pairs (e.g., AB, BC and XY, YZ) using either
feedback or observational training. Inferential performance is
then assessed by asking participants to make judgments about the
relationship between elements of overlapping pairs that were not
explicitly studied together (e.g., AC, XZ). As in other inferential
tasks, the premise associations could be encoded as unitized rep-
resentations, such as an “AB” unit during observational learning
or an A–B stimulus–response association during feedback train-
ing. However, like acquired equivalence judgments, associative
inference would be supported only by discrete elemental hip-
pocampal representations that enable flexible access to individual
event details.
Because the associative inference task can employ observa-
tional learning procedures, it provides an additional flexibility
in research design. While training in the transitive inference and
acquired equivalence tasks is typically limited to a small set of
1An alternative account of the transitive inference task proposes that inferen-
tial probe trials can be solved based on the individual reinforcement histories
of trained stimuli and does not necessitate the formation of a hierarchical
representation (Frank et al., 2003).
overlapping associations learned across multiple exposures, the
associative inference task can be performed using a larger num-
ber of associations and single-trial learning procedures, wherein
each trained association is only seen once during the learning
phase (Zeithamova and Preston, 2010). Such rapid acquisition
of arbitrary information is characteristic of the type of learn-
ing that occurs during daily episodic experiences and provides
a means for studying how inference is performed with limited
direct experience.
CRITICAL ROLE FOR THE HIPPOCAMPUS IN INFERENTIAL
REASONING
Converging evidence from animal and human research indicates
that the hippocampus is necessary for successful performance in
inferential reasoning tasks. In a series of animal lesion studies,
Eichenbaum and colleagues trained rats on overlapping odor–
odor associations using the associative inference (Bunsey and
Eichenbaum, 1996) and transitive inference paradigms (Dusek
and Eichenbaum, 1997). The hippocampal system was dam-
aged prior to training, either by lesion to the hippocampus
proper (Bunsey and Eichenbaum, 1996) or through discon-
nection of the hippocampus from its cortical and subcortical
pathways (Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997). In both tasks, hip-
pocampal lesions impaired performance on inferential probe
trials that tested knowledge of the untrained relationship between
stimuli, while acquisition of the trained associations was unim-
paired (Figures 2A,B). Similar impairments in transitive infer-
ence have been observed in non-human primates with lesions
to the hippocampal system (Buckmaster et al., 2004). Notably,
both lesioned rats (Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997) and lesioned
monkeys (Buckmaster et al., 2004) performed perfectly on novel
non-inferential test trials that probed knowledge about the rela-
tionship between end items of the hierarchy (e.g., A ? F), suggest-
ing that making judgments about novel combinations of familiar
items does not itself require hippocampal processing. Rather,
these findings indicate that the hippocampus plays an essen-
tial role in judgments that require the flexible manipulation of
learned relationships among items when simple comparisons of
reinforcement history do not suffice.
Evidence for an essential role of the hippocampus in the
acquired equivalence task is somewhat inconsistent across species.
Rodent research has shown impaired performance on a spatial
variant of the acquired equivalence task in animals with lesions
to entorhinal cortex but not in animals with hippocampal lesions
(Coutureau et al., 2002). In contrast, neuropsychological research
in humans indicates that hippocampal lesions critically impact
performance in the acquired equivalence task (Myers et al., 2003).
Patients with hippocampal atrophy acquire stimulus–response
associations at a rate similar to control patients and demonstrate
intact memory for these trained associations during the test phase
(Figure 2C). However, these patients are impaired on inferential
judgments testing knowledge of the untrained, equivalent rela-
tionships between items. In contrast, due to basal ganglia dam-
age, Parkinson’s disease patients demonstrate slower acquisition
of the premise associations during the feedback-based learning
phase, but intact performance on both trained and inferential
probes at test. This double dissociation demonstrates the critical,
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FIGURE 2 | Lesion and neuropsychological studies assessing the
critical role of hippocampus in inference. (A) Associative inference task.
Left panel: mean number of errors to criterion on training of two sets of
overlapping associations (e.g., AB, BC). Right panel: Inference performance
as measured by a preference index for indirectly related item (e.g.,
selecting C when cued with A). White bars denote sham operated control
rats; blue bars denote hippocampally lesioned rats. Hippocampally lesioned
rats learn individual relationships between item pairs at a rate similar to
control rats, but fail on the inference test. Adapted by permission from
Bunsey and Eichenbaum (1996), copyright 1996 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
(B) Transitive inference task. Rats with lesions disconnecting the
hippocampus from its subcortical (fornix, dark blue bars) or cortical
(entorhinal/perirhinal, light blue bars) target structures performed similarly
to sham operated control rats (white bars) on trained associations (BC, CD)
and novel non-inferential probe trials (AE). However, lesioned rats were
severely impaired on inferential probe trials (BD). Adapted by permission
from Dusek and Eichenbaum (1997), copyright 1997 National Academy of
Sciences, USA. (C) Mean performance of control participants (white bars),
patients with hippocampal atrophy (blue bars) or Parkinson’s disease
patients (orange bars) in an acquired equivalence task. Patients with
hippocampal atrophy reached a criterion level of performance at a rate
similar to control participants. In contrast, Parkinson’s disease patients
required more extensive training. However, at test, hippocampal patients
were severely impaired on inferential probe trials relative to both control
participants and patients with Parkinson’s disease. Adapted by permission
from Myers et al. (2003), copyright 2003 MIT Press. (D) Post-training
hippocampal lesions (blue bars) impaired transitive inference judgments
(BD) in mice, but enhanced performance on novel non-inferential probe
trials (AE) involving the end items of the hierarchy relative to sham operated
animals (white bars). Adapted by permission from DeVito et al. (2010a),
copyright 2009 Wiley-Liss, INC.
specialized role of the hippocampus in decisions that require the
flexible application of learned knowledge to novel situations in
humans.
These initial neuropsychological and animal lesion studies
provide substantial evidence for the critical role of the hippocam-
pus in inferential reasoning across a variety of experimental
paradigms. One finding common across these experiments is
intact learning of the explicitly trained associations despite hip-
pocampal damage. This may suggest that while the hippocampus
is not required for the acquisition of individual premise asso-
ciations during encoding (when trained across multiple repeti-
tions using feedback-based learning procedures), it is essential
for retrieving and recombining event elements during inference
tests. An alternative possibility is that hippocampal lesions induce
changes in encoding strategy, resulting in a different representa-
tional form for the trained associations that does not allow for
the flexible recombination of information during inference itself
(Eichenbaum et al., 1996; Frank et al., 2003).
From these initial lesion and neuropsychological studies alone,
it is not possible to determine the precise stage—encoding or
retrieval—or the precise mechanism of hippocampal involvement
in inference, as hippocampal damage was present prior to the
initial training phase. More recent findings indicate that multi-
ple hippocampal mechanisms contribute to successful inferential
reasoning, including processes engaged during initial encod-
ing, flexible retrieval, and post-encoding sleep. We discuss these
ideas by reviewing evidence from functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies in humans demonstrating changes in
hippocampal activation during different phases of inferential rea-
soning tasks along with convergent findings from computational
modeling and more recent animal lesion studies.
HIPPOCAMPAL RETRIEVAL PROCESSES THAT SUPPORT
INFERENTIAL REASONING
Inferential reasoning is traditionally thought of as a logical
process in which novel relationships are deduced from knowl-
edge about premise relationships. In the example with the man,
woman, and Great Dane, you have no direct knowledge about
either the relationship between the man and the woman or where
the woman lives. When faced with a misplaced piece of mail
addressed to the house next door, you might retrieve information
acquired during two previous events—that “the man in the house
next door owns the Great Dane” and “the Great Dane belongs
to the woman”—and recombine that knowledge to conclude that
“the woman is my new neighbor.” In doing so, you determine that
you can deliver the mail to her the next time you see her in the
neighborhood. In this way, inferential reasoning is accomplished
at the time of retrieval when faced with a novel judgment.
While inferential reasoning itself has not been traditionally
conceptualized as a function of hippocampus, recent research
highlights the hippocampal role in several of the processes con-
tributing to this ability. In the example above, successful inference
requires the initial encoding of associations, retrieval of these
associations through individual elements when faced with a mis-
placed envelope, and subsequent recombination of information
to yield a solution. Such retrieval-based processes that allow for
the flexible use of previous experience are hypothesized to rely
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on hippocampal memory representations that code event details
individually in terms of their relationships to one another (Cohen
and Eichenbaum, 1993; O’Reilly and Rudy, 2001). This discrete,
relational coding allows event elements to be individually address-
able and retrievable from partial input—a process often referred
to as pattern completion (Marr, 1971; McClelland et al., 1995).
In inference tasks used in the laboratory, novel test probes (e.g.,
AC test trials in associative inference) would trigger hippocam-
pal pattern completion, leading to the retrieval of previously
encountered, overlapping memories (i.e., A was paired with B,
B was paired with C) that could then be recombined to support
successful inferential judgments (Figure 3A).
Several human neuroimaging studies have provided evidence
that the hippocampus plays an important role in successful
inference at the time of retrieval (Heckers et al., 2004; Preston
et al., 2004; Zalesak and Heckers, 2009). In one such study, par-
ticipants were trained on overlapping face–house associations
(AB, BC) and non-overlapping face–face associations (DE) in a
modified version of the associative inference paradigm (Preston
et al., 2004). Participants were then tested on the learned asso-
ciations (AB, BC, DE) as well as novel face–face associations
(AC) that required mediation through explicitly learned common
houses (Figure 4A).While a region in posterior hippocampuswas
engaged for all associative retrieval trials, bilateral anterior hip-
pocampus was uniquely engaged during inferential (AC) memory
probes. This pattern of response was unique to the anterior hip-
pocampus, providing support for its role in the flexible use of
memory at retrieval.
Hippocampal engagement during retrieval-based inference has
also been observed in transitive inference tasks (Heckers et al.,
2004; Zalesak and Heckers, 2009). In one such study, participants
were presented with pairs of stimuli and trained to select the
rewarded item from each pair (e.g., A > B). Two sets of pairs
were used: overlapping pairs (A>B, B>C,C>D,D>E) forming
an ordered hierarchy and non-overlapping pairs (a > b, c > d,
e> f, g> h) with no hierarchical structure (Heckers et al., 2004).
Novel test probes consistingof the elements fromoverlappingpairs
(e.g., A ?C,B ?D)produced greater hippocampal engagement than
did novel test probes comprised of items from non-overlapping
associations (e.g., c ? f). However, this study did not directly
address the role of hippocampus in inferential test trials, as
there was no comparison made between inferential probe trials
requiring reference to the stimulus hierarchy (e.g., B ? D) and
non-inferential probe trials containing the hierarchy’s end items
(i.e.,A ?E). Ina follow-upexperiment (ZalesakandHeckers, 2009),
participants were trained on a six-element hierarchy and tested on
inferential relationships between inner members of the hierarchy
(i.e., B ? D, C ? E, B ? E) and non-inferential pairs including the
end items (e.g., A ? D, C ? F) that could be solved based solely
on knowledge of the reinforcement histories. Left hippocampus
showed greater activation during retrieval of inferential relative to
non-inferential probe trials (Figure 4B). Additionally, the degree
of hippocampal activation during inferential probe trials was
related to the relative distance between items in the transitive
hierarchy. Greater activation was observed in right hippocampus
for inferential judgments with one degree of separation between
probe items (i.e., B ? D, C ? E) relative to inferential judgments

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Integration at encoding
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FIGURE 3 | Symbolic depiction of encoding and retrieval strategies
that may support inference. (A) Retrieval-based inference through recall
and recombination of individual memories. When encountering a novel
inferential probe (e.g., AC), the individual elements may trigger hippocampal
pattern completion mechanisms, leading to the retrieval of the previously
encountered overlapping associations (AB, BC) that can be then
recombined to answer novel questions. In this example, when having to
select which of the two men lives with the woman, one can recall that the
woman lives in the red house, and that the man on the left also lives in the
red house. Therefore, the woman lives with the man on the left. (B)
Integration of overlapping events during encoding. When encountering an
event that overlaps with prior experience (e.g., experiencing BC after
encountering AB), the overlapping element (B) may trigger hippocampal
pattern completion, reactivating the prior memory. The current experience
may then be encoded in the context of the reactivated memory to form an
integrated (A-B-C) representation that combines elements from both
events. In this example, the prior memory for the woman living in the red
house may be reactivated when learning about the man living in the same
house. The current and reactivated experiences can then be combined to
form a novel association that the man and the woman live together.
with two degrees of separation between probe items (i.e., B ? E),
suggesting that hippocampal activation tracks the degree of
relational processing required for successful inference.
While these human fMRI studies demonstrate that the hip-
pocampus is engaged during inferential judgments, they cannot
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FIGURE 4 | Hippocampal retrieval activation during inferential
reasoning tasks. (A) Bilateral anterior hippocampus demonstrated
selective activation during novel inferential probe trials (AC) at retrieval in an
associative inference task. In contrast, a posterior region of the
hippocampus demonstrated equivalent activation during associative
retrieval of overlapping trained associations (AB, BC), non-overlapping
trained associations (DE), and inferential probe trials. Adapted by
permission from Preston et al. (2004), copyright 2004 Wiley-Liss, INC.
(B) During transitive inference, left hippocampal activation demonstrated
greater retrieval activation for novel inference trials relative to non-inference
trials, while right hippocampus showed increased activation during
inference trials in which items were separated by one element in the
hierarchy (1◦) compared with items separated by two hierarchical elements
(2◦). Adapted by permission from Zalesak and Heckers (2009), copyright
2009 Elsevier.
demonstrate whether such engagement is necessary for successful
performance. In a recent animal lesion study, selective hippocam-
pal damage produced after acquisition of overlapping memo-
ries severely impaired performance on inference judgments in a
transitive inference task, providing direct evidence for the essen-
tial role of the hippocampus beyond the initial training phase
(Figure 2D; DeVito et al., 2010a). Interestingly, animals with hip-
pocampal lesions performed more accurately than did control
animals on the non-inferential probe trials involving end items.
These data show that animals with hippocampal lesions relied
primarily upon the reinforcement histories of individual stimu-
lus elements (most salient for end items) rather than the relative
contingencies of reinforcement between items. Presumably, post-
encoding hippocampal lesions specifically eliminatedmemory for
the relationships between items that would be needed for suc-
cessful inferential performance, while leaving intact information
about the reinforcement patterns of individual stimuli.
Collectively, these findings indicate that hippocampal mem-
ory representations are accessed during inferential judgments.
However, additional evidence suggests that other brain regions
are recruited in concert with the hippocampus in service of
successful inference. Activation in the dorsolateral and medial
prefrontal cortex has been observed during transitive inference
in humans (Acuna et al., 2002), and lesions to medial prefrontal
cortex produce selective impairments on the critical inference
judgments in the transitive inference (DeVito et al., 2010b) and
acquired equivalence tasks (Iordanova et al., 2007). Furthermore,
activation in prefrontal cortex and medial temporal lobe (MTL)
structures is more tightly coupled during inferential retrieval
judgments relative to memory judgments for directly learned
information in an associative inference task, with activation in
inferior frontal gyrus and medial prefrontal cortex further dif-
ferentiating between correct and incorrect inference performance
(Zeithamova and Preston, 2010).
The respective roles of hippocampus and prefrontal cortex in
inferential retrieval have yet to be determined. One possibility is
that the hippocampus supports memory for directly experienced
associations, while structures in prefrontal cortex sub-serve rela-
tional reasoning processes (Robin and Holyoak, 1995; Christoff
et al., 2001) whereby the contents of hippocampal representations
are manipulated and recombined to support the inference itself.
Some evidence for this view comes from a non-mnemonic infer-
ential reasoning task in which all premise relationships were con-
currently displayed along with the probe judgment (Wendelken
and Bunge, 2010). In this study, the hippocampus was similarly
engaged during both probe trials requiring consideration of a
single premise relationship and probe trials requiring inference
across multiple premise relationships. However, prefrontal cortex
was preferentially engaged during inferential judgments. In this
non-mnemonic inference task, the hippocampus may be process-
ing individual relationships among premise elements, an opera-
tion required for both probe trial types. Only those probe trials
requiring inference across multiple premises necessitate manip-
ulation and recombination through prefrontal processing to sup-
port inference. An alternative possibility is that hippocampusmay
also contribute to the actual manipulation of relational infor-
mation (Hannula et al., 2006; Hannula and Ranganath, 2008),
creating novel combinations of elements extending beyond prior
experience. Findings demonstrating hippocampal engagement
unique to inferential judgments (Preston et al., 2004; Figure 4A)
may reflect such processes. While the respective contributions of
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the hippocampus and prefrontal regions in inferential reason-
ing remains an active area of study, there is substantial evidence
suggesting that these regions form an integrated network for rela-
tional processing (DeVito et al., 2010b; Ranganath, 2010) that is
engaged during inferential reasoning.
HIPPOCAMPAL ENCODING PROCESSES THAT SUPPORT
INFERENTIAL REASONING
Initial studies of inference primarily focused on the role of hip-
pocampus in flexible retrieval processes in which novel probes
(e.g., B ? D in transitive inference) trigger recall of directly expe-
rienced memories (B> C, C > D), with inference (B > D) being
supported by flexible recombination of recalled memories. This
focus on retrieval-based processes describes how memories are
recombined ormodified after they are initially encoded. However,
more recent neuroimaging studies support the notion that hip-
pocampal encoding plays an equally important role in successful
inference.
In one of the first human neuroimaging studies on infer-
ence, Nagode and Pardo (2002) used positron emission tomog-
raphy (PET) to examine the relationship between hippocampal
encoding activation and successful transitive inference. Greater
hippocampal activation was observed during the intermedi-
ate relative to initial stages of training, suggesting experience-
dependent changes in hippocampal recruitment during encoding.
In a second experiment, participants were first trained on non-
overlapping portions of the transitive hierarchy (A > B, C > D,
E > F, G > H) followed by training on the “bridging,” or over-
lapping, pairs (B > C, D > E, F > G) that connected the initially
learned associations. Hippocampal activation was greater during
training of the bridging pairs relative to training on the non-
overlapping pairs in the hierarchy. A similar pattern of findings
was shown by Greene and colleagues, who scanned participants
during both training and test phases of the transitive inference
task using fMRI (Greene et al., 2006). During the latter part of
the learning phase, left hippocampal activation was greater for
inner training pairs (B > C, C > D) relative to outer training
pairs (A > B, D > E), with this difference in activation cor-
relating with individual differences in inferential performance
(Figure 5A). Greater test-phase activation was also observed in
hippocampus for inferential test probes (B ? D) among those par-
ticipants who were successful at inference (“performers”) relative
to unsuccessful participants (“non-performers”), suggesting that
the way in which associations are initially encoded relates to the
ability to later use them flexibly. Together, the results of these neu-
roimaging studies demonstrate a contribution of hippocampal
encoding processes to novel inferential judgments.
Animal research is also consistent with the idea that hippocam-
pal encoding processes are important for successful inference. As
previously discussed, hippocampal damage that occurs after ini-
tial learning eliminates memory representations that code the
relationships among elements in a transitive hierarchy, while
leaving intact information about the reinforcement histories of
individual items (DeVito et al., 2010a). Presumably, animals
with post-training lesions demonstrate significant impairments
on inference tests due to loss of the representations of critical
relationships among event elements formed by the hippocampus
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FIGURE 5 | Hippocampal encoding activation during inferential
reasoning tasks. (A) Left hippocampal activation increased across training
block for inner pairs in the transitive hierarchy (B > C) relative to outer pairs
(A > B), but only for those participants who were successful on the
inferential test. Adapted by permission from Greene et al. (2006), copyright
2006 MIT Press. (B) In an associative inference task, right hippocampal
activation during encoding of overlapping associations (BC) was greater for
trials in which the corresponding inference judgment (AC) was later correct
relative to trials on which the inference judgment was later incorrect.
Hippocampal activation during initially acquired associations (AB) was not
related to subsequent inferential performance. Adapted from Zeithamova
and Preston (2010). (C) Activation in left and right hippocampus during the
training phase of an acquired equivalence task was correlated with
individual differences in inference performance. Specifically, increases in
bilateral hippocampal activation from the early to late portion of the training
phase were associated with superior performance on inferential probe
trials. Adapted by permission from Shohamy and Wagner (2008), copyright
2008 Elsevier.
during encoding. Furthermore, recent animal research indicates
that hippocampal lesions performed prior to learning produce
even greater deficits in inferential performance than do post-
training lesions (van der Jeugd et al., 2009), highlighting the
critical role of hippocampus during the encoding process.
While the above discussed human neuroimaging and
animal lesion studies established the importance of the
hippocampal encoding processes in successful inference, the
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precise mechanisms by which hippocampus contributes to
performance cannot be determined from these data alone.
Two hippocampal encoding mechanisms have been proposed
to underlie subsequent inference: (1) elemental encoding of
individual premise associations and (2) integrative encoding. As
previously expressed, elemental encoding is critical to successful
inference and refers to the initial encoding of experience such that
memories can be later accessed through individual event details.
Such elemental representations formed by hippocampus during
encoding are essential for retrieval-based inference processes in
that they enable access of necessary details when faced with a
novel judgment about items not directly experienced together.
In addition to the flexible, elemental encoding of individual
associations, compelling new evidence suggests that the hip-
pocampusmay also support inferential judgments by dynamically
integrating newly encountered information into existing memory
networks at the time of learning—a process termed integrative
encoding (Shohamy andWagner, 2008; Zeithamova and Preston,
2010). According to this hypothesis, the hippocampus not only
forms relationships among elements within an individual experi-
ence, but also links elements across discrete experiences.
During integrative encoding, new experiences are not only
encoded in the context of presently available information, but also
in the context of internally generated memory representations
of prior overlapping events (Figure 3B). Through reactivation
of previous experience (Eichenbaum, 2000; O’Reilly and Rudy,
2001; Shohamy andWagner, 2008), hippocampal processing may
allow for integration of information across distinct experiences
in anticipation of future use. This constructive, or prospective,
nature of memory (Klein et al., 2002; Buckner, 2010; Addis and
Schacter, 2011) dates back to Tolman’s concept of a “cognitive
map” (Tolman, 1948) and has been proposed as a key mechanism
underlying successful inferential reasoning (O’Reilly and Rudy,
2001; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008; Zeithamova and Preston,
2010). As related memories have already been integrated during
encoding, this mechanism—in contrast to flexible recombination
at retrieval—predicts that inference judgments may not require
any additional processing during test.
For example, let us return to the scenario with your new neigh-
bors, theman, woman, andGreat Dane.When you initially see the
man leaving the house next door with his Great Dane, you form a
memory for the event that represents the relationship between the
man, the dog, and the house. Upon seeing the Great Dane a sec-
ond time with the woman, the familiar element (the Great Dane)
may serve as a cue for hippocampal pattern completion, leading
to the reactivation of your prior experience with the dog. The new
event (the woman walking the Great Dane) is then encoded in
the presence of the reactivated information about your first expe-
rience with the dog. In this way, a link between the man, the
woman, and the house next door can be formed during encod-
ing, despite the fact that you have never seen the woman with
the man or at the house next door. Therefore, when you receive
the misplaced piece of mail addressed to the house next door, no
new recombination of information is required; rather, you can
directly retrieve your memory that the man and the woman are
your new neighbors and determine that you can deliver the mail
to either of them when you see them around the neighborhood.
Importantly, elemental encoding of individual associations and
integrative encoding are not mutually exclusive. Rather, integra-
tion of new information into an existing memory depends on
elemental encoding of the initial memory such that it can be
reactivated when the overlapping element (the Great Dane) is
encountered again in the second episode.
Recent animal and human research has demonstrated reacti-
vation of prior events during new learning. For instance, elec-
trophysiological studies in rodents have shown hippocampally
mediated replay of prior event sequences in new spatial con-
texts (Karlsson and Frank, 2009) and sequential activation of
hippocampal place cells for never-experienced spatial trajecto-
ries that represent a shortcut through a well-learned environment
(Gupta et al., 2010). Furthermore, in environments with over-
lapping elements, individual hippocampal neurons demonstrate
experience-dependent generalized firing patterns that respond in
multiple similar locations (Singer et al., 2010) or to the overlap-
ping features themselves (Wood et al., 1999). Such generalized
firing patterns suggest that hippocampal neurons develop repre-
sentations that code the similarities between events. By represent-
ing features common to multiple events similarly, hippocampal
codes can capture regularities shared across different experiences
and, in doing so, may act as “nodes” that link distinct behavioral
episodes (Eichenbaum et al., 1999). Converging findings from
human neuroimaging research have demonstrated hippocam-
pally mediated reactivation of prior experience during encoding
of new overlapping events that was associated with greater reten-
tion of originally learned information (Kuhl et al., 2010). These
findings demonstrate that reactivating memories during new
learning helps reduce forgetting of past events, and it is pos-
sible that a similar mechanism underlies successful inferential
reasoning.
The notion that related events are integrated during encod-
ing is consistent with the symbolic distance effect, which refers
to increased accuracy and decreased reaction time for judgments
comparing items farther apart in a stimulus hierarchy. The sym-
bolic distance effect is often (Frank et al., 2005; Zalesak and
Heckers, 2009), although not universally (Moses et al., 2006),
observed in transitive inference tasks. Integration during encod-
ing would promote the formation of a single hierarchical repre-
sentation of overlapping stimuli (A > B > C > D > E > F)
rather than the formation of representations of each individual
pair (A > B, B > C, C > D, D > E, E > F). If the transi-
tive inference task was solved by retrieval and recombination of
individual learned relationships at test, it should be easier infer
the relationship between items with one degree of separation
(e.g., B ? D) than between items with two degrees of separation
(e.g., B ? E), as the former requires retrieval of just two represen-
tations (B > C and C > D) while the latter requires retrieval of
three (B > C, C > D, and D > E). A single hierarchical repre-
sentation has the advantage of directly encoding the relationships
between distant stimuli along with the directly learned relation-
ships, making indirectly learned relationships readily available
at the time of test. In contrast to the retrieval-based mecha-
nism, this representational structure would predict that inferences
about items far apart in the hierarchy (e.g., B > E) would be eas-
ier than inferences for items that are close together (e.g., B>D)
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because their relative positions in the hierarchy are more
distinct.2
Recent neuroimaging studies provide more direct evidence
for an integrative encoding process in hippocampus in acquired
equivalence (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008) and associative infer-
ence paradigms (Zeithamova and Preston, 2010). In the acquired
equivalence task, increases in hippocampal activation across the
learning phase were associated with individual differences in
inferential performance, even when accounting for performance
differences on trained associations (Figure 5C). Moreover, no dif-
ference in test-phase activation between inferential and trained
probes was observed, and reaction times for inferential probe tri-
als and trained associations at test did not differ for successful
participants (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008). These findings sug-
gest that successful performance in the acquired equivalence task
is dependent upon the formation of the inferential relationships
during encoding that are immediately available when probed
with novel combinations of items at test. Hippocampal encoding
activation also predicted trial-by-trial success in the associative
inference task (Zeithamova and Preston, 2010). Specifically, trial-
by-trial measures of hippocampal activation during encoding of
overlapping associations (BC), but not initially acquired asso-
ciations (AB), differentiated between subsequently correct and
incorrect inferential judgments (AC; Figure 5B). Importantly,
while both hippocampal and prefrontal responses are implicated
in successful inference performance at the time of test, this pattern
of encoding activation is only observed in the hippocampus and
surrounding MTL cortex. Thus, converging evidence from these
different paradigms suggests that successful inference can be sup-
ported by a hippocampus-specific encoding mechanism whereby
overlapping experiences are integrated into a network of related
memories as they are learned.
Current computational models of hippocampal function
emphasize a specific role for the CA3 region in the formation of
integrated relational memory networks (Wallenstein et al., 1998).
According to such models, CA3 neurons develop “context fields”
during learning that bind together elements within a single event.
Through such binding, CA3 context fields respond preferentially
to temporally contiguous stimuli or events. This mechanism that
binds together items in the same sequential context may also
provide a potential neural substrate for the integration of expe-
riences that share common features beyond temporal context. In
simulation experiments, the formation of context fields in CA3
models during the acquisition phase of the associative inference
task led to correct performance on the inferential probe trials
during test (Wallenstein et al., 1998). In contrast, CA3 models
that did not develop context fields failed on associative inference
trials, despite successful acquisition of the trained associations.
This finding suggests that CA3 binding processes are critical to
the formation of integrated memories and successful inference.
2The symbolic distance effect is also consistent with the value transfer account
of the transitive inference task, which proposes knowledge of individual rein-
forcement histories underlies performance. Notably, this alternative account
also argues against a retrieval-based mechanism for inference (von Fersen
et al., 1991; Frank et al., 2003).
Future animal research or human neuroimaging studies utiliz-
ing high-resolution fMRI techniques (Zeineh et al., 2003; Bakker
et al., 2008; Preston et al., 2010) may provide additional insight
into the precise hippocampal mechanisms that support the type
of mnemonic flexibility required in inferential reasoning. For an
extended discussion of computational perspectives on the role
of hippocampus in inference, see the review by Kumaran in this
special topic (Kumaran, 2012).
It is noteworthy that a direct contradiction exists among neu-
roimaging studies of inferential reasoning: while several studies
have demonstrated enhanced hippocampal engagement during
inferential reasoning probes (Heckers et al., 2004; Preston et al.,
2004; Zalesak and Heckers, 2009; Wendelken and Bunge, 2010;
Zeithamova and Preston, 2010), others have failed to find evi-
dence for retrieval-based hippocampal processing during infer-
ence, instead linking inferential ability primarily to encoding
processes (Nagode and Pardo, 2002; Shohamy andWagner, 2008).
While it is important to not over-interpret the null test-phase
findings in these studies, several possible explanations may be
worth exploring in future research that may help make sense of
these apparent empirical contradictions. For example, the num-
ber of training trials during the learning phase of inference tasks
may have a major influence on the type of hippocampal rep-
resentation recruited in service of successful inference. In many
cases, a limited set of overlapping associations (e.g., five in tran-
sitive inference) are trained across many repetitions (e.g., Nagode
and Pardo, 2002). In other cases, a large number of overlap-
ping associations are learned in a single exposure (Zeithamova
and Preston, 2010) or relatively few repetitions (Preston et al.,
2004). Integrative encoding may fully support inference during
learning of a limited set of experiences across many repetitions,
as there are multiple opportunities to build and strengthen the
links between different trained associations as they are learned.
In contrast, such hippocampally mediated integration may not
be sufficient in tasks that utilize large stimulus sets and single-
trial learning procedures, leading to the additional recruitment of
retrieval-based hippocampal mechanisms. For example, both an
integrative encoding signature and increased retrieval activation
for inferential probes were observed in a single trial associa-
tive inference task (Zeithamova and Preston, 2010), suggesting
that both processes may be recruited in a single task. Other
task demands may similarly influence when one hippocampal
mechanism—integration during encoding or recombination at
retrieval—is favored over another, including feedback-based vs.
observation learning and interleaved vs. blocked presentation of
training associations. Understanding how the dynamics of the
task influence the recruitment of the hippocampus at different
stage of learning may provide key insights into computational
properties of the hippocampus and its functional role in infer-
ential reasoning.
INFERENCE AND SCHEMAS
The notion that the hippocampus contributes to inferential rea-
soning by integrating new experiences into existing memory
networks to form links between distinct events is conceptually
related to an emerging body of literature on the role of the hip-
pocampus in the formation of schemas. Schemas are knowledge
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frameworks that capture regular patterns in the environment by
abstracting information across experiences (Bartlett, 1932) and
represent features common to multiple different events while dis-
carding idiosyncratic details. For example, a “restaurant schema”
may contain commonly experienced elements such as sitting at a
table, ordering from amenu, and paying the bill, but not one-time
elements such as the waiter spilling water on you.
Schemas guide behavior by providing a set of expectations
for a given experience. Like integrated memory representations,
schemas also contain information derived from multiple events
that may support inferential decisions. Specifically, schemas rep-
resent relationships between elements commonly associated with
certain types of situations, despite the fact that these elements
have not necessarily been experienced together. Moreover, encod-
ing new events in the context of a reactivated schema may provide
an additional mechanism for inferential reasoning. For example,
a person may come to your table at the end of your meal and
inquire about the quality of the food and service. In the absence
of an introduction, you may infer that this person is the owner
or manager of the restaurant because your restaurant schema
contains information about who is likely to ask for feedback
about your dining experience. Like the integrative encoding pro-
cesses discussed in the previous section, schemas build knowledge
representations from multiple individual events and may thus
involve neuralmechanisms similar to the hypothesized integrative
encoding processes that support inference.
Few studies to date have directly explored the role of the
hippocampus in the formation of schemas. One recent neu-
roimaging study in humans (Kumaran et al., 2009) revealed
hippocampal-ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) interac-
tions during application of a task schema; only hippocampus
was associated with speeded transfer to a perceptually novel task
with a similar structure. Schema-dependent speeded learning has
also been observed in rodent research, which demonstrated that
reactivation of an existing task schema (in this case, a familiar
spatial layout) allowed for rapid acquisition of new flavor–place
associations in a single trial (Tse et al., 2007, 2011). Without
an existing schema, such associative learning required repeated
training across multiple weeks. Importantly, rats with hippocam-
pal lesions fail to show facilitated learning of new information in
the presence of reactivated schemas, highlighting a critical role for
this region in the rapid incorporation of new information into
existing knowledge frameworks.
While direct evidence linking schema formation and updat-
ing to integrative encoding processes observed in inference tasks
is lacking, the striking similarities between findings from these
two literatures provide strong evidence that the hippocampus
plays a unique role in binding processes that integrate informa-
tion across distinct events. Furthermore, several inference studies
have examined well-learned knowledge structures by extensively
training participants on a set of associations before introducing
overlapping events. This potentially schema-like knowledge could
then support the rapid encoding of new overlapping information,
as observed in spatial learning paradigms in rodents. However,
whether hippocampal engagement in inference tasks reflects a
similar or precisely the same representational mechanism as that
employed during schema formation is yet to be seen.
While one important characteristic of schemas is the loss of
idiosyncratic details that code the differences among events, it
remains unknown whether the same is true of integrated memory
representations. Anecdotal evidence from the acquired equiva-
lence paradigm suggests that some event details may also be lost
during integration, as participants fail to recognize inferential
probe trials as novel pairings of stimuli (Shohamy and Wagner,
2008). This finding suggests that details about directly experi-
enced events may sometimes be lost in favor of an abstracted,
generalized framework that codes consistencies among distinct
stimulus-response relationships. However, whether a similar
loss of detailed event information is typical in other inference
paradigms, especially those that utilize rapid acquisition proce-
dures (e.g., single-trial learning), is not known. More research
is needed to understand how the processes that support infer-
ence are related to those implicated in the formation and use
of schemas. Consideration of how task dynamics influence the
type of representational structure formed may provide impor-
tant insights into how the hippocampus codes overlapping event
information and interacts with other brain regions (in particular,
prefrontal cortex) to support mnemonic flexibility.
SLEEP-BASED REPLAY AS A MECHANISM FOR MEMORY
INTEGRATION
Recent theories suggest that hippocampally mediated replay of
event sequences during sleep (Hoffman and McNaughton, 2002;
Ji and Wilson, 2007) provides a potential mechanism for con-
structing networks of related memories that anticipate future
decisions and actions (Diekelmann and Born, 2010; Sara, 2010;
Lewis and Durrant, 2011)—a process referred to as prospective
consolidation (Buckner, 2010). Such theories propose that by
reactivating memories during sleep, representations are recom-
bined and recoded, resulting in rich networks of related mem-
ories that extend beyond initially encoded events. According to
this view, stored memories are not veridical representations of
events, but rather derived representations formed in anticipa-
tion of future use. Sleep-based replay of hippocampal memory
traces, therefore, could enhance performance on inference tasks
that tap knowledge about the relationship between overlapping
events experienced at different times.
The majority of inferential reasoning studies reviewed here
administered the training and critical test phases within the
same experimental session, leaving open important questions
about the impact of sleep on inference performance. However,
one study using the transitive inference paradigm directly exam-
ined whether or not sleep enhances inferential reasoning ability
(Ellenbogen et al., 2007). Participants were trained on five over-
lapping associations (A > B, B > C, C > D, D > E, E > F)
and were then tested on novel inferential pairs (e.g., B ?D, B ? E)
and novel non-inferential pairs (A ? F) after a delay of 20min,
12 h (with or without sleep), or 24 h. While performance on
the novel inferential judgments was at chance after a 20-min
delay, significant inference was observed at the 12-h (both sleep
and wake groups) and 24-h time intervals. Interestingly, the
group who performed the inference test after a 12-h period
with sleep showed superior performance on the inferential judg-
ments involving two degrees of separation (B ? E) compared
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 70 | 10
Zeithamova et al. The hippocampus and inferential reasoning
to the group who performed the test after a 12-h period of
wakefulness.
While these findings provide speculative evidence that sleep
facilitates inference, it is important to note that the training
procedures in this study led to a pattern of behavioral perfor-
mance that is atypical among animal and human research using
this paradigm. Specifically, the study was designed to ensure low
levels of performance immediately following learning; thus, rela-
tively weak representations for explicitly learned associations may
account for many of the observed effects of sleep. In addition,
the time-dependent improvement after the 12-h interval with
sleep was not unique to transitive inference judgments but was
also observed for the novel non-inferential judgments contain-
ing the end elements (A ? F). Therefore, the question of whether
sleep enhances memory integration specifically or whether it
contributes to improved inferential judgments by simply consol-
idating memories for individual premise associations is yet to be
determined. Future research is needed to fully establish the precise
role of sleep and the putative neural mechanisms of sleep-based
memory integration in the broad range of inferential reasoning
tasks described here.
HIPPOCAMPAL REPRESENTATIONS UNDERLYING
INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE EXPERIENCES
Initial research suggests that one way in which the hippocampus
contributes to inferential reasoning is by integrating informa-
tion across multiple experiences to establish links between related
events, either when new experiences are first learned or offline
through replay of related experiences during sleep. However,
intriguing questions remain regarding the precise nature of the
underlying hippocampal representations.
Several theoretical and computational frameworks have
proposed alternate accounts of the properties of memory
representations that can support inference. One hypothesized
representational structure supporting inference across experi-
ences is one in which new events are incorporated into existing
memory traces to be parsimoniously represented in a single, com-
posite memory representation (Figure 6A). For instance, consider
the simplified example of two events that share a common ele-
ment (AB, BC) as used in the associative inference paradigm.
When a new event occurs that contains an element overlapping
with a previous event (e.g., BC after encoding of AB), the overlap-
ping element (B) can trigger pattern completion of the previously
encoded memory (AB). According to this hypothesized represen-
tational structure, elements from the new, overlapping event (in
this case, C) would be encoded into the existing, reactivated mem-
ory (AB) to form a single integrated representation that combines
the two experiences (ABC). Because these integrated representa-
tions directly code the novel relationship between A and C along
with the original experiences, this representational format pro-
vides a basis for the inferential use of memory, but has a notable
cost in that details of the individual experiences may not be pre-
served (e.g., the knowledge that A and C were presented in two
different temporal contexts).
The influential cognitive map theory (Tolman, 1948; O’Keefe
and Nadel, 1978)—which first sparked interest in the infer-
ential function of the hippocampus—implicitly assumes such
A B C
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A B C
AB
A B
BC
C
AB
A B
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C
FIGURE 6 | Schematic depiction of alternative accounts of
hippocampal representation in an associative inference task.
Representations of overlapping events (AB, BC) are shown using a
simplified two-layer architecture. The bottom layer contains units for each
event element; the top layer contains hypothesized patterns of hippocampal
representation. (A) Single integrated representation for overlapping events.
According to this hypothesized structure, new, overlapping event elements
(C) are encoded into an existing, reactivated memory (AB) to form a single
composite representation for the two related associations. (B) Pattern
separated representations of individual events. In this view, a new event
(BC) with partial overlap to a previous memory (AB) would recruit a distinct
hippocampal representation that preserves the details of each individual
experience. Links between the common element (B) and each of the
individual experiences could be used to mediate inference at encoding or
retrieval. (C) Relational representation of overlapping events. In this
framework, separate representations are maintained for overlapping events
(AB, BC) and direct links between those events (at the level of the
hippocampus) code their relationship to one another.
integrated representations. In the context of this theoretical spa-
tial framework, memory traces for newly learned individual
events (i.e., recently traveled routes) are combined with mem-
ories of previously traveled routes to allow for the creation of
an integrated map of the environment, including information
about paths not traveled. As a cognitive map of an environ-
ment becomes established, it can be reactivated when an animal
enters the same environment at a later point and updated with
new experiences in that environment. When familiar routes to
a goal are blocked, the cognitive map will enable navigation to
the goal via an alternate route because information about this
novel (i.e., never before traveled) route is included in a single
representational structure of the environment. In the context of
non-spatial inference tasks, there is some evidence to support this
hypothesized representational structure. For example, one study
showed that successful participants perform as quickly on infer-
ential judgments as on explicitly trained associations (Shohamy
and Wagner, 2008), suggesting similar representations for both
directly learned and inferential associations. Moreover, informal
assessment suggested that the majority of participants in this
study failed to recognize the inferential probes as novel combi-
nations of items, perhaps indicating that some contextual details
of original experiences were lost. Returning to our Great Dane
example, you may remember that the man and the woman are a
couple with a dog, but may not remember specific details about
how you first encountered them. Future studies may provide a
more detailed account of the circumstances under which memory
for original experience may become degraded.
The loss of experiential detail is a significant downside to the
single, composite representational structure linking elements of
discrete events. Other computational perspectives propose a dif-
ferent representational structure for hippocampus, with pattern
separation processes preserving distinct individual experiences
and recurrent connections between the element and event
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representations allowing inference across experiences (Figure 6B;
McClelland et al., 1995; Kumaran and McClelland, 2010). In our
simplified example, this representational structure would pre-
dict that a new event partially overlapping with a previous event
(i.e., BC) would recruit a different hippocampal representation to
make it distinct from the originally experienced event (AB). The
two events would be linked through their individual connections
to the shared event element (B). Because of the recurrent con-
nections between individual element and event representations
(ascribed to entorhinal cortex and hippocampus, respectively),
such a hypothesized structure allows for preservation of event
details while also supporting inferential judgments about the
relationship between experiences. For example, when presented
with a novel inferential probe (AC), each individual element
(A and C) may serve as a partial cue leading to the reactiva-
tion of the originally experienced events (AB and BC). Activation
of the common item (B) in both cases would lead to successful
inference. Results showing unique hippocampal responses dur-
ing inferential retrieval (Preston et al., 2004; Zalesak and Heckers,
2009; Zeithamova and Preston, 2010) might reflect the use of
such pattern-separated inputs to support performance. This rep-
resentational structure can also explain recruitment of the hip-
pocampus during encoding of overlapping events (Shohamy and
Wagner, 2008; Zeithamova and Preston, 2010), which potentially
reflects changes in the weights linking common elements to the
individually experienced events.
It is important to note that even such pattern-separated rep-
resentations would be expected to change over time and become
more generalized. Reactivation of these memory representations
during the consolidation process or during sleep-based replay
would result in more frequent reactivation of common elements
and strengthening of their connections to event representations.
In contrast, idiosyncratic elements unique to individual events
would be reactivated less frequently and gradually lose their con-
nections to event representations (Lewis and Durrant, 2011).
This process would lead to the gradual loss of episodic details in
favor of abstracted representations that capture regularities across
experiences.
An alternative view that combines elements of both of these
frameworks stems from relational memory theory (Cohen and
Eichenbaum, 1993). Relational memory theory proposes that
the hippocampus maintains representations of individual events
while also directly encoding relationships between separate expe-
riences (Eichenbaum, 1999). In our symbolic representation of
this theory, different hippocampal units are recruited to rep-
resent individual events, but a lateral connection exists at the
second level, linking the representations of overlapping events
together (Figure 6C). Both pattern separation and pattern com-
pletion at the level of the hippocampus would contribute to
the formation of such networks of related memories. For exam-
ple, a new overlapping event (BC) would recruit a hippocampal
representation distinct from the originally experienced event
(AB). Simultaneously, the overlapping element (B) serves as a
partial cue that reactivates the prior event (AB). Based on a
Hebbian learning rule, the connection between the two hip-
pocampal memory traces would be strengthened and an explicit
link between the overlapping events would be formed. Like the
representational structure above, such relational networks would
support mnemonic inference while simultaneously preserving
memory for individual experiences. It remains for empirical
research to test the predictions stemming from these alternate the-
ories of hippocampal representation. In doing so, we will gain
a more complete understanding of the computational proper-
ties of the hippocampus underlying inferential reasoning, and
whether or not the same representational format is used across
all inference paradigms, training procedures, and individuals (see
Kumaran, 2012 for further discussion).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In summary, extensive evidence indicates that the hippocam-
pus plays an important role in inferential reasoning abilities that
require judgments about the relationship between multiple items
or events. It does so by building flexible memory representations
that provide details not only about individual event elements,
but also about the relationships between different events. In this
way, the function of the hippocampus is not merely to enable
the retrospective use of memory; rather, hippocampal function is
“intrinsically prospective” (Klein et al., 2002), aimed at construct-
ing representations that can be used to successfully negotiate
future judgments and actions. Inferential reasoning tasks thus
provide a powerful tool for studying this adaptive nature of mem-
ory and how the computational properties of the hippocampus
allow memories to be reconstructed into prospectively useful
formats.
More generally, the findings reviewed here add to a growing
body of evidence that hippocampal processing and representation
play an important role in behaviors beyond the episodic memory
domain, including working memory (Ranganath and D’Esposito,
2001; Hannula et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2006a,b), implicit mem-
ory (Chun and Phelps, 1999; Ryan et al., 2000; Daselaar et al.,
2006; Schnyer et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2007; Preston and
Gabrieli, 2008; Hannula and Greene, 2012), perception (Barense
et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2005a,b; Barense et al., 2007; Bussey
and Saksida, 2007; Lee et al., 2012), and even short-term plan-
ning and imagining of future events (Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis
et al., 2007a,b; Addis and Schacter, 2008, 2011; Voss et al., 2011;
Johnson et al., 2012). Such findings do not fit within standard
memory systems theories that focus on task-based dissociations
stemming from the verbalizability of information (Squire, 1992;
Gabrieli, 1998) and require new conceptions of hippocampal
function. The research outlined here emphasizes the need to cen-
ter research efforts on specific hippocampal computations that
may serve a number of behaviors, thus providing a theoretical
and empirical basis for the broader role of the hippocampus in
cognition.
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